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President Trump’s December announcement that the Navy will develop a new “Trump-class” line of large surface combatants rocked Washington and instantly rewrote the conversation about American sea power. The Navy’s official release confirmed the plan and named the first ship the USS Defiant, saying the program will begin with two hulls and aim to restore U.S. shipbuilding strength.
Administration officials have publicly pitched the ships as a centerpiece of a new “Golden Fleet,” describing them as 30,000 to 40,000 ton combatants intended to carry unprecedented firepower and to eventually number 20 to 25 vessels. The initial timeline targets construction in the early 2030s, with proponents arguing the ships would provide long-range strike options and command capability unmatched by current surface combatants.
Washington’s critics are predictably alarmed by the armament the president touted: hypersonic weapons, advanced lasers, and even sea-launched cruise missiles that could be nuclear-capable. Those are not idle boasts; mainstream reports and Navy briefings list hypersonic strikes and deep-strike cruise missiles among the platforms envisioned for the program, which is precisely the kind of asymmetric deterrent a rising China must reckon with.
Still, sober conservatives should acknowledge the legitimate logistical gripes. Critics from both sides warn about costs, timelines, and the Navy’s recent record of extravagant programs plagued by overruns, and independent outlets have estimated very high per-ship costs and serious technical challenges. Those warnings are a useful reality check, not a reason to abandon the strategic intent of rebuilding American industrial and deterrent power.
Columnists like Steve Forbes have raised practical concerns that deserve attention: diverting scarce shipbuilding dollars from submarines, unmanned platforms, and proven capabilities could leave critical gaps while the new hulls are being designed and built. Forbes also cautions about the risks of mixing conventional and nuclear-capable missiles on the same platform and about vulnerabilities to missile saturation attacks — points that should shape how the Navy designs defenses and command-and-control safeguards.
That said, conservatives should not reflexively side with the bureaucratic status quo that has allowed America’s shipbuilding base to atrophy. The Navy’s own statement touts supplier involvement across the country and the program’s potential to revive yards and high-skilled jobs in all 50 states, a patriotic return to industrial muscle that helps deter adversaries before war begins. If we can build a hyper-capable surface node that improves lethality and command in contested waters, we should explore it aggressively.
The right response is pragmatic patriotism: fund the Trump-class design effort but insist on concurrent investment in quiet submarines, long-range missiles, unmanned systems, and the hardening of ship defenses. Steve Forbes’s prescription to repair procurement, allow longer-term budgeting, and stop endless design changes is precisely the kind of reform conservatives should champion to make any major program viable.
Opponents will scream about naming and spectacle, and some will try to turn legitimate program oversight into petty political theater. Naming conventions aside, the substantive debate must be whether this program strengthens America’s hand in the Indo-Pacific and restores an industrial base that supports a free and prosperous order. If Congress and the Pentagon prioritize outcomes over vanity, the Trump-class could be a tool of deterrence rather than an exercise in ego.
Congress now faces a choice: underfunded platitudes and bureaucratic inertia, or decisive appropriations tied to accountability, performance metrics, and procurement reform that actually deliver capability. The conservative answer is clear — back American shipyards, demand results, keep the force balanced, and never apologize for building strength that preserves liberty and protects our allies.
