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Retired FAA investigators and 9/11 whistleblowers are sounding a loud alarm in a recent interview: America’s aviation security still has holes big enough to fly a hijacked jet through. Men like Bogdan Dzakovic, who once led FAA Red Team testing, say their old warnings weren’t fully fixed — and that should frighten anyone who flies or cares about national security.
What the whistleblowers are saying about aviation security
These veterans tested airports and told the government where the system failed. They say Red Teams could smuggle fake explosives and weapons onto planes with worrying ease before 9/11 — and covert tests later still showed serious gaps. Their message in the new interview is blunt: unless TSA, the FAA, and Congress act, another catastrophic attack could happen. If that sounds alarmist, remember these are people who spent years trying to “think like a terrorist.”
The evidence backs the warnings — not just fearmongering
This isn’t just old men telling stories. Dzakovic testified to the 9/11 Commission about testing failures. Government watchdogs have repeatedly found problems, too. The GAO has said covert testing improved but must be more risk‑focused and better at forcing fixes. Internal inspector testing reported very high failure rates in some undercover checks. In short: audits and tests have shown the same weaknesses the whistleblowers describe.
Why this matters for travelers and national security
A successful attack on aviation would be a national catastrophe — and airports are still attractive targets. The risk rises during international tensions and regional conflicts, when bad actors probe for weakness. The stakes are simple: lives, economic disruption, and the fear that comes with a hit to public confidence. We should prefer action over hope, because hope doesn’t screen luggage or fortify cockpit doors.
Fix it now — real steps, not pat answers
Lawmakers and agency leaders need to stop treating this like a paper exercise. Require regular, risk‑informed covert testing. Set firm deadlines to fix vulnerabilities and publish results. Harden cockpit access and upgrade baggage screening where tests show gaps. And hold leaders accountable when audits show failures. If we ignore seasoned whistleblowers and audit findings because reform costs money or drama, we’ll pay with something far worse than headlines. It’s time to treat aviation security like the serious, ongoing mission it is — not a box to check at budget season.
