The Justice Department announced this week that two men pleaded guilty and were sentenced for acting as agents of the People’s Republic of China. The case reads like a spy novel, but it’s real. Liren “Ryan” Lai and Yuance Chen will each serve 30 months behind bars and face three years of supervised release after admitting they worked at the direction of China’s intelligence service to collect information on U.S. military personnel and installations.
Sentenced for acting as agents of China
The Northern District of California handled the case. U.S. Attorney Craig H. Missakian and FBI Special Agent in Charge Scott Schelble said federal prosecutors proved the men acted under direction of China’s Ministry of State Security, the country’s main civilian spy agency, according to government filings. Both men pleaded guilty to conspiracy and to acting as undisclosed foreign agents under 18 U.S.C. § 951. Judge Jon S. Tigar imposed the 30‑month sentences after guilty pleas were entered late last year and earlier this year.
Tradecraft exposed: dead drops, cash, and targeting U.S. military
Prosecutors described classic spy tradecraft in plain terms: dead‑drop cash payments, covert deliveries, and photographing U.S. military sites and personnel. The government alleges one dead drop was roughly $10,000 left in a backpack at a locker in Livermore, and another planned payment was near $20,000 in Phoenix. Agents in San Francisco led the investigation with help from other FBI field offices and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. Those are not Hollywood props — they are the tools an adversary used in an attempt to chip away at our security.
Why this case matters for national security
This prosecution matters because it shows how seriously foreign intelligence services — by the government’s account, China’s MSS — are operating on U.S. soil. The targets were not corporate secrets but our service members and military installations. That makes this not just lawbreaking but a direct threat to national defense. The guilty pleas and sentencing are facts. The details prosecutors filed reveal an organized effort to gather sensitive information and try to recruit assets inside the U.S. military.
What should change next
All of this raises questions that deserve blunt answers. Thirty months for working as an agent of a foreign intelligence service seems short, given the stakes. We should demand tougher penalties and faster disruption of espionage networks. We should also tighten vetting, improve counterintelligence inside our bases, and keep pressure on Beijing through policy, sanctions, and diplomacy. Call it common sense: national security is not a game, and we need law enforcement and lawmakers to act like they mean it.
