Security researchers revealed a sharp supply‑chain strike that let hackers slip malicious JavaScript into Optimizely’s Project JavaScript fields and serve it from Optimizely’s own CDN. The attack hit big, trusted sites and delivered a multi‑purpose payload that stole cryptocurrency, skimmed credit cards, and even tried to pounce on iPhones and iPads — until Optimizely moved to remove the code and patch the hole.
What happened: Optimizely attack and the malicious JavaScript
Researcher Scott Helme and his team at Report URI found the injected code. They analyzed roughly 1,611 Optimizely snippets and identified 188 infected snippets tied to about 178 organizations. The JavaScript ran from cdn.optimizely.com, so the malicious files looked like normal, trusted site code. Optimizely confirmed an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product, removed the injected code, and said it patched the path the attackers used.
Why this matters: supply‑chain risk and what the payload did
This was a textbook supply‑chain attack. By writing into Project JavaScript, attackers rode the vendor’s trust to reach visitors of major sites. The payload did several things at once: it swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card details from first‑party forms, collected cookies and screenshots, and included a conditional branch aimed at iOS exploit chains. Researchers tracked roughly $7,000 in crypto to attacker wallets during the observed activity — not a fortune, but proof the scheme worked for some victims.
Who’s at fault and what companies should do now
Blame starts with the vendor that let an attacker write code into projects that run on millions of pages. Optimizely has to answer how broad the access was and why stronger controls weren’t in place. Customer companies also share responsibility for auditing third‑party scripts and enforcing stricter controls. Practical steps are simple: require phishing‑resistant MFA, rotate API keys, audit Project JavaScript change histories, enforce Content Security Policy and Subresource Integrity where possible, and treat potentially exposed form fields and cookies as compromised until proven clean. If you run a site and still trust a vendor like it’s Fort Knox, wake up.
What readers should do now
If you entered card details on affected sites during the exposure window, check your statements and call your card issuer for suspicious charges. If you copied a crypto address from a page that day, double‑check the receiving address in your wallet app. iPhone and iPad users should install the latest system updates. Companies using Optimizely need to audit and, if necessary, disable published experiments until they confirm projects are clean. Bottom line: this attack is a reminder that trust in big tech tools must be earned — not assumed — and accountability should follow when that trust is broken.

